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With the advent of Groupon.com in 2008, daily deal platforms have seen phenomenal 
growth. Surprisingly there is very sparse analytical research that has studied the 
economics of the daily deal platforms that they connect merchants to consumers. We 
develop a stylized two-period Stackelberg leader-follower game-theoretic model to 
analyze the strategic interaction between heterogeneous merchants and a daily-deal 
website. The monopolist daily deal website is revenue maximize. Merchants take into 
consideration the sampling, advertising and cannibalization effects when they decide 
participation and discount strategy on the daily-deal website. Our result shows the 
merchants offer higher discount rates on the daily deal website and less known 
merchants benefit more from offering deals on the daily deal website. Some of the 
merchants never offer a deal on the platform even if offering a deal on the platform is 
free. 
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Introduction 
Daily-deal business models came to limelight with the advent of Groupon in 2008 which became the 
fastest online business to reach one billion dollar valuation in history (Steiner, 2010).  Though it is only 
the fifth year (Dholakia, 2012) of evolution for online daily-deal industry, it is estimated that consumers 
will spend $ 3.6 billion on the daily-deal websites in 2012. It is an increase of nearly 87% over 2011 spends 
and around 60% of all online shoppers subscribe to a daily-deal website in the US (Freed & Berg, 2012). 
While daily-deal industry has seen phenomenal growth in the last five years, market analysts have raised 
concern about its sustainability, growth and profitability (Clifford & Miller, 2012) and business models 
pursued by these websites have been questioned (Cohan, 2012; Etter & McMillan, 2012). 
A daily-deal website offers consumers with “deals” per day in each of the local markets it serves. 
Consumers and merchants are drawn to the daily-deal website for attractive deals and large market 
coverage respectively. Though the daily-deal websites are similar to coupons in that the daily-deals also 
provide discounts, there are some key differences. First, daily-deal websites like Groupon.com or 
LivingScoial.com offer deals and often offer discounts of more than 50% while traditional coupons are 
more heterogeneous with relatively lower discount rates and many times coupons have a dollar value. 
Second, the daily-deals offered by these websites have to be first purchased by the consumers and then 
used to get the service or product from the merchant and these deals are often non-refundable. On the 
other hand, a coupon or a voucher, digital or printed, is redeemed only at the point of purchase. The third 
key difference is that these digital deals are offered on the website and the daily-deal website can monitor 
sales of deals. The ability of the websites to monitor revenue generated by sales allows them to offer a 
revenue sharing contract which may not be viable in the case of traditional coupons. This revenue sharing 
agreement between merchants and the website is viewed as more effective in attracting businesses as they 
pay only when consumers take action of buying the deal. Though merchants share transaction revenue 
with the website, they do not pay large upfront fixed fee of traditional marketing channels like advertising 
which do not guarantee commensurate additional revenue generation.  
This unique business model of daily-deal websites was hailed as the ultimate electronic commerce 
business model. At the peak, there are over 10,000 daily-deal websites worldwide, majority in Asia, in 
June 2011. Interestingly enough, market changed dramatically since after highly successful public offering 
of Groupon in November, 2011. Groupon has lost more than three fourths in market valuation, 
LivingSocial, arguably the second largest daily-deal website, postponed its anticipated IPO and thousands 
of daily-deal websites have closed.  
The rise and fall of daily-deal websites in such a short time horizon has drawn attention from analysts 
from Wall Street to entrepreneurs at San Jose. Heated debates focus on the business model, especially on 
the “lopsided” agreements with merchants.1 Many critics view it is as too costly for merchants to offer 50%, 
discount and then share 50% transaction revenue with the daily-deal website.2 Moreover, one does not 
observe much variation in discount rates of deals and revenue sharing agreements. This narrow range of 
revenue sharing ratio may render daily-deal websites attractive to only certain types of merchants.3  
Thus, it is important to understand the dynamics of a daily-deal website’s revenue sharing contract with 
merchants. In order to study the impact of revenue sharing ratio on merchants’ participation and discount 
rate strategy, in this paper, we develop an analytical model to explore the following questions: (i) When, 
and more specifically, for what type of businesses offering deals on a daily-deal website may be profitable? 
(ii) How the interplay of advertising, sampling and cannibalization effects impact merchant’s 
participation and discount strategy on daily-deal website? (iii) How business and consumer 
characteristics affect the profitability of merchants and in turn affect the websites optimal revenue sharing 
ratio?  
Consumers in the local market are often not aware about the product and service offerings of some 
merchants. Local merchants participate in daily-deal website to reach out to large number of consumers 




3Groupon Isn’t For Everyone: Do’s and Don’ts for Small Business Owners, http://www.nfib.com/business-resources/business-
resources-item?cmsid=56739 
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who are members of the daily-deal website. We refer to this increase in market reach of merchants 
through offering deals on the website as the advertising effect. Further, consumers who are unaware 
about the product offerings of a merchant may also underestimate the quality. This is particularly critical 
because daily-deal websites are popular among those businesses that offer experience goods or services 
like restaurants, fitness centers and beauty treatment salons. Some of the consumers who buy a product 
offered on a discounted price on the website may update their quality beliefs and may directly buy the 
product at regular price from the merchant in future. Further, many consumers may use a daily-deal 
website to acquire information about a new merchant, and become loyal consumer after their first 
experience. We refer to this increase in market share as the sampling effect of a daily-deal website. 
Daily-deal website attracts not only new consumers but also existing consumers of a merchant who would 
have paid the full prices. Thus, offering deals on a daily-deal website may lead to revenue loss from 
merchants’ existing consumers. We refer to this loss as the cannibalization effect. In addition, one of 
criticisms to the daily-deal websites’ business model is that some of consumers are price sensitive and 
never come back to business without coupons. We refer to these consumers as the deal seekers.     
Daily-deal websites provide a venue where business can reach out for large consumer coverage and 
consumers can experience the goods offered via an attractive deal. Merchants value these advertising and 
sampling effects of daily-deal websites differently because of their inherent heterogeneities in term of the 
existing proportion of informed consumers who know about the quality of their product offerings. For 
example, a newly established restaurant whose target is to convert consumers to regular clients recognizes 
the size of consumers who seek information on a daily-deal website. On the other hand, a spa salon whose 
priority is to fill up empty slots weighs more the reach for new consumers that a daily-deal website 
commands. On the other hand, some of the existing regular consumers of a business may buy the product 
on the daily-deal website. This shift of regular consumers who would have bought the product at its 
regular price to making purchase on the daily-deal website leads to revenue loss to the merchant. 
Therefore, the merchants need to balance the potential negative effect of cannibalization with positive 
benefits of advertising and sampling effects. 
There are limited academic works which study the ecosystem of daily-deal websites. Edelman et al. (2010) 
develop a simple model which only captures a merchant’s decision of offering a deal to two heterogeneous 
consumer segments and assume away any strategic actions by the website, to study the price 
discrimination and advertising effects of a daily-deal website. They find that it might be more profitable 
for less known merchants or merchants with lower marginal cost to offer deals. Byers et al. (2011) study 
the economics of online daily-deals to understand Groupon’s operational strategy and identify an 
opportunity for price-based revenue optimization through purchase incentive, deal scheduling and 
duration, and deal featuring. Examining sentiments expressed in the popular press, Dholakia (2012) 
reports mixed empirical results: some business owners speak glowingly of Groupon, while others regret 
their online deals. Kumar and Rajan (2012) use an analytical model and data from merchants to show that 
profitability of offering deals on a daily-deal website depends on the discount rate, size of new consumers, 
and existing consumers. Some earlier studies (Anand & Aron 2003; Kauffman & Wang 2001) have 
examined other online group buying schemes that arose before emergence of daily-deal websites, to 
understand the economics of dynamic pricing. Our paper focuses on the impact of revenue sharing ratio 
announced by the website on merchants’ participation and discount decisions. 
In our setting, daily-deal website is a Stackelberg leader and merchants are followers who sell an 
experience good whose true quality is revealed to an uninformed consumer only after consumption 
(Nelson, 1974; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). We develop a two-period model similar to Bils (1989) where 
merchants offer discounts on the daily-deal website to first-time consumers and extract surplus in the 
second period. Our modeling approach is also similar to models of introductory offers of Shapiro (1983) 
and Bagwell (1990). Merchants are heterogeneous in proportion of informed consumers and consumers 
form a priori expectation about the quality of good based on product characteristic. This 
conceptualization is similar to the treatment of advertising by daily-deal websites like Groupon in 
Edelman et al., (2010) where some consumers are simply not aware about the merchant’s existence, but is 
different from Shapiro (1983) where some consumers over-estimate the quality of the good. In our setting 
consumers consistently underestimate the quality of the good and realize the true quality only upon 
consumption. This is justified in our context where a merchant whose product has been overestimated by 
the consumers will never offer a deal. Since consumers underestimate the true quality of the product, a 
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daily-deal website allows a merchant to offer discounts at a different rate to consumers on the website 
which captures the sampling effect of the website. 
We find that the merchants’ participation strategy depends on the optimal discount rate strategy which in 
turn is driven by quality uncertainty and proportion of deal seekers in the market. In determining the 
optimal discount strategy merchants’ tradeoff positive benefits of advertising and sampling with the 
negative impact on revenue due to cannibalization. Under some conditions, merchants increase the 
discount rate as website’s revenue sharing ratio increases. Merchants with low proportion of informed 
consumers are more likely to participate even if the revenue sharing ratio is very high because they have 
large positive advertising benefit and relatively low loss in revenue due to cannibalization. Website’s 
optimal revenue sharing ratio takes into account revenue from each merchant and mass of participating 
merchants. Since the mass of participating merchants decreases as revenue sharing ratio increases, even 
though revenue to the website from each merchant increases as sharing ratio increases, there exists an 
optimal revenue sharing ratio. Surprisingly, the revenue sharing ratio deceases as quality uncertainty 
decreases. We also find the support for the suggestion that it is not optimal for a daily-deal website to 
have a 50% revenue sharing agreement for all types of merchants with heterogeneous products and 
market characteristics. We also recommend that a website should also lower the revenue sharing ratio 
when the proportion of deal seekers is large.  
Model 
We consider a market consisting of three types of players, a monopolist daily-deal website, a set of 
merchants, and a set of consumers. While daily-deal website and the merchants make strategic decisions, 
consumers are price-takers. The market consists of unit mass of consumers and the daily-deal website 
attracts Cn  proportion of consumers. Among the consumers on the daily-deal website,  proportion of 
consumers are deal seekers who buy only when they get a deal, and 1  proportion consumers are 
information seekers who may buy at regular price (without deal). The information seekers are attracted 
to the daily-deal website to try out new merchants and seek information about their offerings, while deal 
seekers are attracted to daily-deal website because they are price sensitive. The website is characterized by 
this exogenous parameter (0,1) . 
Merchants, who sell a homogeneous experience good of quality q  which may be a product or service, are 
heterogeneous in terms of consumers’ awareness about their product and service offerings. We denote the 
consumers who are aware about a merchant as informed consumers and those who are unaware about the 
merchant as uninformed consumers. Informed consumers are aware about the true quality q  of the 
product offerings of the merchant but uninformed consumers have some uncertainty about the quality 
even when they become aware about the merchant. We denote this quality uncertainty of the uninformed 
consumers when they become aware about the merchant by (0,1)k , such that uninformed consumers’ 
expected quality is [ ]E q kq .  
This quality uncertainty is resolved only after the consumption of the good. In other words, the parameter 
represents the degree of quality uncertainty of uninformed consumers and is likely to be different for 
different product or service categories.  Consumers who are not aware about a spa salon and a fitness 
center are likely to have higher uncertainty about quality (lower k ) for spa salon compared to the fitness 
center. To that extent, quality uncertainty parameter k  is a product specific characteristic. Further, 
consumers are heterogeneous in valuation of quality. The quality valuation parameter,  , is  consumers’ 
private information though the distribution [0,1]U   is common knowledge.  
Merchants are heterogeneous in terms of consumers’ awareness about their product and service offerings. 
Parameter   captures this heterogeneity such that the proportion of informed consumers for a merchant 
of type   is   and proportion of uninformed consumers is 1  . In other words,   captures the market 
size of a merchant in the regular market, and a merchant with higher   has a larger market size. 
Merchants’ market size parameter   is uniformly distributed [0,1]U   and it is merchants’ private 
information though its distribution is common knowledge. We assume that the marginal cost of serving 
additional consumer of merchants is negligible and normalize the same to zero. 
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Purchase decisions by consumers 
We consider a two-period game. Merchants may offer deals on the daily-deal website in the first period 
which attracts both informed and uninformed consumers, and no deal is offered in the second period. Let 
the regular price be p  and discount offered on the daily-deal website be (0,1)d  in the first period. This 
implies that in the first period the price paid by a consumer who decides to buy is p  in the regular market 
and (1 )p d  on the daily-deal website, and the price paid is p  by consumers who decide to buy in the 
second period. Note that the experience good or service is sold at the same price in the regular market in 
both periods and all transactions take place outside the website in the second period. Each consumer buys 
one good or nothing from each merchant in each period. A consumer buys the good only if he derives non-
negative surplus from purchase of the good.  
In the first period, there are three types of consumers. First, there are 
Cn  mass of consumers who are 
aware (informed consumers) about a merchant of type   and are also on the website. Second, there are 
(1 )Cn   mass of consumers who are aware about a merchant of type   but are not on the website. Third, 
there are (1 ) Cn  mass of consumers who were not aware about a merchant of type   but are on the 
website. Note that (1 )(1 )Cn   mass of consumers is neither on the website nor were informed about the 
merchant and are not making any purchase decisions. 
 
Figure 2.  Consumer purchase decision in two periods 
 
The informed consumers whether on the website or not know the true quality q  of merchant’s product 
offerings. On the other hand, consumers who are on the daily-deal website, but were uninformed have the 
a priori expectation of quality [ ]E q kq . Thus, a consumer’s utility from buying the experience good in 
the first period is: 
1
informed consumers outside the website
( ) (1 ) informed consumers on the website
(1 ) uninformed consumers on the website
q p










Consumers who have non-negative utility in the first period buy the experience good. Uninformed 
consumers who buy the experience goods in the first period on the daily-deal website update the quality 
expectation to true quality after consumption. Note that  proportion of consumers on the website 
(informed or uninformed) are deal seekers and they do not buy the good at the regular price in the second 
Economics and the Value of IS 
6 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013  
period. Thus, a non-deal seeker consumer’s utility from buying the experience good in the second period 
is: 
2
informed consumers and uninformed consumer who bought in first period
( , , , )
uniformed consumer who did not buy in first period
q p









Figure 2 provides a detailed decision tree of consumers in the two periods. 
 
Daily-deal Website 
The daily-deal website offers a revenue sharing contract to merchants and takes a s  fraction of the 
revenue generated on the website. The strategic interaction between the website and the merchants is a 
leader-follower game, where the daily-deal website is leader and merchants are followers. After the 
website announces revenue sharing ratio s , merchants decide to (i) offer a deal on the website or not, and 
(ii) discount rate d . When a merchant of type  offers a deal on the website, then it pays s  proportion of 
revenue to the website in the first period from the revenue generated from informed and uninformed 
consumer who transact on the website in the first period.  
The profit of offering a deal on the daily-deal website for a merchant type  consists of net revenues from 
informed and uninformed consumers in two periods. In the first period, the price on the website after 
discount is (1 )p d and the merchant get only  (1 )(1 )p d s  after revenue sharing with the website. Let 
the demand proportions of informed and uninformed consumers on the website in the first period be w1iD  
and w1uD , and demand proportion from informed consumer in the regular market in the first period be 
1u
oD . Then given that 
Cn and (1 ) Cn are informed consumers on the website and (1 )Cn  are informed 
consumers outside the website, the first period profit of a merchant of type   who offers a discount d  on 
the daily-deal website is: 
  w w o1M 1i 1u 1i(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )C C Cn D p d s n D p d s n D p  (1) 


















  . 
Note that uninformed consumers who are not on the website are not aware about the merchant and do 
not buy. In the second period, merchants do not offer any discount and only those consumers who get 
positive utility and are not deal seekers buy. Let the demand of informed and uninformed consumers in 
the second period who did the transaction on the website in the first period be w2iD  and 
w
2uD , and who 
transacted in the regular market in the first period be o2iD . Then given that only 1  proportion 
(information seekers) of those consumers who are on the website in the first period consider buying in the 
second period, the profit of a   type merchant in the second period is: 
  w w o2M 2i 2u 2i(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )C C Cn D p n D p n D p  (2) 
Hence the profit of a   type merchant in the two periods who offers discount d  on a daily-deal website 
which allows has revenue sharing ratio of s  is: 
   M 1M 2M  (3) 





( (1 ) (1 ) (1 ))dC Cs n D p d n D p d  (4) 
Note that when a merchant decides not to participate on the website, then w1i 0D  and 
w
1u 0D  in (4). 
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Note that the discount d  offered by a merchant of type   may depend on the revenue sharing proportion 
announced by the daily-deal website. Some merchants of certain types may not offer a deal on the website, 
and their revenue on the website is zero. Figure 2 describes the sequence of the two-period and Table 1 
provides summary of notations. 
 
 
Figure 2. Sequence of the game 
 
Table 1.  Summary of Notation 
   proportion of informed consumers for a 
merchant 
Cn  proportion of consumers on the website 
   proportion of deal seekers on the website 
    consumer valuation for quality 
k    uninformed consumers’ quality  uncertainty 
q    true quality of experience goods 
p    merchants’ regular price 
d   discount rate on the website in the first period  
s  daily-deal website’s revenue sharing ratio 
 tM       merchant’s profit from consumers outside 
the website in period t 
w
tiD      merchant’s demand from informed 
consumers on the website in period t 
w
tuD      merchant’s demand from uninformed 
consumers on the website in period t 
o
tiD        merchant’s demand from informed 
consumers outside the website in period t 
W    daily-deal website’s revenue over two 
periods from participating merchants 
Merchants’ Discount and Participation Decision 
Offering deals on the daily-deal website allows merchants to access uninformed consumers who are on 
the website but were not aware about the merchants’ offering of the experience good. This increases the 
market size of the merchants and we characterize this as the advertising effect of the daily-deal website. 
This effect has positive impact on the merchants’ revenue and depends on the proportion of consumers 
who are on the website Cn , and the proportion of the uninformed consumers (1 )  for a merchant of 
type  . The advertising effect is stronger if the website has a larger consumer base (higher Cn ) or the 
merchant has lower proportion of informed consumers (lower  ).  
Uninformed consumers, who are exposed to the merchants on the website, have uncertainty about the 
quality of the experience good. Merchants offer deals or discounts off the regular price to induce these 
uninformed consumers with quality uncertainty to try in the first period, and then buy at the regular price 
in the second period. The daily-deal website can be thought of as an intermediary who distributes 
merchants’ digital deals to consumers on the website in the first period. We characterize this effect of 
inducing uninformed consumer to try out the good in the first period as the sampling effect. The strength 
of the sampling effect depends on the discount rate offered by the merchants. Further, merchants decide 
the optimal discount rate by taking into account the quality uncertainty k , the proportion of deal seekers 
  and the revenue sharing ratio s .  
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Offering deals on the daily-deal website also introduces two type of risks to the participating merchants. 
One risk is that merchants incur loss of revenue from the informed consumers who would have bought 
the good at the regular price but now buy at the discounted price on the website in the first period. We 
characterize this as the cannibalization effect. The scale of this cannibalization effect depends on the 
proportion of informed consumers  , the proportion of consumers in the market who are on the website 
Cn , and discount rates offered by the merchants d . The cannibalization effect becomes more severe for a 
merchant with higher proportion of informed consumers (higher  ) or when larger proportion of market 
are on the website (higher Cn ), or merchants offer higher discount rates (higher d ).  
Another risk to the merchants who offer deals on the website is that when informed consumers observe a 
merchant offering deal on the website, then they expect that the merchant will offer deals on the website 
in the future, and thus, may not buy at the regular price in the second period. Moreover, some of the 
uninformed consumers who are on the website may be highly price sensitive or expect the merchant to 
offer deals in the future, and may not buy at the regular price in the second period. This risk is captured 
by the parameter  . This is the proportion of consumers who are deal seekers and have no intention of 
making a repeat purchase at regular price in the second period. This risk may reduce the gain of revenue 
from the uninformed consumers on the website and therefore may reduce the positive benefit of the 
sampling and advertising effect to the participating merchants. In addition to this, this risk may increase 
the loss of revenue to the informed consumers for offering deals on the website. Note that, this negative 
impact of offering deals on the website is in the addition to the cannibalization effect discussed above. 
Merchants also need to take into consideration the daily-deal website’s announced revenue sharing ratio 
s . A higher revenue sharing ratio implies merchants are asked to pay a greater fraction of the revenue of 
deals in the first period. This revenue includes all deals sold to both informed and uninformed consumers 
on the website in the first period. Note that any increase in s  may decrease the positive benefit of 
advertising and sampling effect and may increase the negative impact of cannibalization effect.  
In this setting, the daily-deal website first announces the revenue sharing ratio s , and merchants react to 
that announcement, and decide whether to offer deals on the website and the discount rate if they decide 
to offer deals. In deciding the optimal revenue sharing ratio, the website needs to take into consideration 
the response of merchants and hence, we first analyze merchants’ discount and participation strategy.   
Benchmark case: No deal offered on the website 
Before examining the merchants’ discount and participation strategy on the website, we establish the 
benchmark case where merchants do not offer deals on the website. In order words, what is the optimal 
revenue of  a  type merchant in the regular market where there is no daily-deal website?  
Since only the informed consumers know about the true quality of the experience good and merchant,  a 
 type merchant’s revenue function over the two periods is: 
B 1i 2i( ) ( )p D D p  
where 1iD  and 2iD  is demand proportion from the informed consumers (  proportion of the mass of 
consumers) in the first and the second period. Note that since the uninformed consumers do not know 
about the product offerings of the merchant, hence they do not buy. Therefore, the merchant’s revenue 
function does not include demand from the uninformed consumers in the benchmark case. 
A consumer who has   valuation for quality buys the good in the first period if 0q p   . Hence, all 
consumers who have ( / )p q   buy the good in the first period. More formally, 1i 1 ( / )D F p q  where 
(.)F  is cumulative density function.  Since    is uniformly distributed, we have 1i 1 /D p q . Since the 
informed consumers know the true quality of the good, they do not update the quality in the second 
period and all consumers who buy in the first period also buy in the second period. Hence, 2i 1iD D . 
Now, we can rewrite the merchant’s revenue function over the two periods as: 
 B( ) 2 (1 / )p p q p  (5) 
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A merchant of type   maximizes revenue in (5) by choosing optimal price p . Solution to the merchant’s 
optimization problem gives the optimal price, demand in two periods and profit as: 
* / 2p q , 1i 2i 1 / 2D D  ,
* / 2B q  
 
Merchants offer deals on daily-deal website 
Merchants offer deals on the daily-deal website to access uniformed consumers and offer deals to induce 
them to buy in the first period at a discounted price, and after realizing the true quality, buy at the regular 
price in the second period. Advertising effect and sampling effect have positive impact on merchants’ 
revenue. However, merchants also are exposed to risks of revenue loss from the informed consumers on 
the website in the first period due to cannibalization effect, and in the second period due to the deal 
seeking behavior among consumers on the website. Thus merchants make the trade-off between the 
positive and negative effects of offering deals on the website to determine the optimal discount rate. 
Merchants participate on the daily-deal website if and only if they have higher revenue from participation 
than the benchmark case, * *M / 2B q . 
Merchants offer discount off the regular price on the daily-deal website in the first period. The regular 
prices charged by merchants in both periods remain the same. Informed consumers who are not on the 
website make their purchase decision taking into consideration the regular price in the first period. In 
other words, merchants commit to a price in both periods (Edelman 2011). Merchants do not offer any 
discount or deal in the second period and hence, the optimal regular price is the same as in the 
benchmark case, / 2p q .  
There are two types of consumers on the website, informed and uninformed consumers. The informed 
consumers know the quality of the good q , and the uninformed consumers expect the quality to be kq . 
Since merchants offer discount off the regular price on the website, the demand proportion of the good 
from the informed consumers on the website in the first period is  W1i 1i 1 / 2D D . Moreover, the 
demand proportion for the good from the uninformed consumers on the website in the first period is also 
driven by the discount rate. On the other hand, demand proportion from the informed consumers in the 
second period is the same as in the benchmark case W2i 2i 1 / 2D D , because the valuation of informed 
consumer remains the same in both periods. The demand proportion from the uninformed consumers in 
the second period depends on the discount rate offered in the first period, but can never be larger than the 
demand proportion in the benchmark case W2u 2i 1 / 2D D , because the merchants charge the regular 
price in the second period. In other words, w2u0 1 / 2D . 
Therefore, merchants will not set discount rates higher than what is required to induce the uninformed 
consumers to would buy at the regular price if they knew the true quality. Given that, the demand for the 
uninformed consumers in the second period is w2u 1 (1( ) / )d kqD p . Since 
w
2u0 1 / 2D , hence, 
1 (10 ( ) / ) 1 / 2p d kq . By simplifying this inequality, we get (i) when 1 / 2k , then the optimal 
discount rate is * [1 2 ,1 ]d k k  , and (ii) when 1 / 2k , then  * [0,1 ]d k . Proposition 1 describes 
optimal discount strategy of merchants with different proportion of informed consumers ( ). 
PROPOSITION 1: For any given revenue sharing ratio s  announced by the website, (i) the merchants 
offer discount rate * 1 2d k  when 1/ 2k    ; (ii) the merchants offer discount rate
* ˆ ((1 2 ),(1 ))d d k k     when 1/ 2k  ( , )   ; (iii) * ˆ [0,(1 ))d d k    when 1/ 2k  ( ,1]  ; and 
(iv) the merchants offer discount rate * 1d k   when   .  
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Figure 3.  Optimal discount rates for different types of merchants 
 
Proposition 1 outlines the optimal discount rates of merchants for any given quality uncertainty 
parameter of uninformed consumers k , the proportion of deal seekers   and the website’s announced 
revenue sharing ratio s . Irrespective of quality uncertainty parameter k , merchants with relatively lower 
  (  ), that is with lower proportion of informed consumers in the market, offer largest discount rate 
of 1 k , if they offer deals on the website. When there is large quality uncertainty, that is 1/ 2k  , then 
merchants with moderate proportion of informed consumers, that is     , reduce the discount rate 
as proportion of informed consumers increases and all merchants with relatively higher  (  ) offer 
the lowest optimal discount rate of 1 2k  on the website (Left panel, Figure 3) . When 1/ 2k  , then no 
merchant offers 1 2k  discount rate (Right panel, Figure 3). 
When merchants’ proportion of informed consumers ( ) increases the potential revenue gain from the 
advertising effect decreases. It is because the proportion of uninformed consumers (1  ) on the website 
decreases. The revenue loss due to the cannibalization effect increases, because the proportion of 
information consumers on the website (
Cn  ) increases. Therefore, merchants with higher   offer lower 
discount on the website when they make the trade-off between cannibalization effect and advertising 
effect. On the other hand, merchants with relatively low (  ) have lower cannibalization effect and 
higher benefit from advertising effect. Therefore, these merchants offer the highest discount rate 1d k 
to achieve optimal benefit of sampling effect. Note that, merchants never offer discount rates higher than 
1d k  . It is because by offering higher discount rates than 1 k , merchants do not gain additional 
revenue from the uninformed consumers in the second period, but get sub-optimal revenue in the first 
period from them.  
In the case where uninformed consumers’ quality uncertainty is high ( 1/ 2k  ), it is unprofitable to offer a 
low discount rate ( 1 2d k  ). It is because by offering a discount rate 1 2d k  , merchants cannot attract 
any uninformed consumers to buy in the first period and therefore, derive no revenue gain in the second 
period. But the merchants experience loss from informed consumers in the first period due to 
cannibalization. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the minimum discount rate 1 2d k  , increases if the 
k  decreases. This finding provides support to the observed business practice of offering high discount 
rates on daily-deal website for experience goods which may have level of quality uncertainty, like spa 
salon and beauty treatment services.  
Merchants’ optimal discount rate is impacted by the proportion of deal seekers on the daily-deal website 
which limits the revenue gain from consumers in the second period. The revenue sharing ratio announced 
by the website also affects merchants’ revenue in the first period. In the next two propositions, we discuss 
the impact of these two factors on the merchants’ optimal discount rate strategy.  
PROPOSITION 2: For any given revenue sharing ratio s  announced by the website, as the proportion 
of deal seekers   increases,  (i) the lower merchant type   decreases for all k , and when 1/ 2k   then 
the upper merchant type   also decreases; and (ii) discount rate offered by merchants of relatively high 
  or low  remains the same, but merchants with intermediate   lower the discount rate. 
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Figure 4.  Optimal discount rates for different types of merchants as  changes 
 
The proportion of deal seeking consumers on the daily-deal website affects merchants’ profitability of 
offering deals on the website. When the proportion of deal seekers who do not buy at the regular price in 
the second period increases, the potential revenue gain from the uninformed consumers, that is, the 
positive sampling effect decreases. In addition, revenue loss from the informed consumers, that is, the 
cannibalization effect worsens as more informed consumers turn to deal seekers and do not buy at the 
regular price in the second period. As the proportion of deal seekers increases, merchants with higher 
proportion of informed consumers are impacted more severely and they reduce the discount rate to save 
revenue loss from the cannibalization effect. Note that when 1/ 2k  , then merchants lower discount rate 
bounded by 1 2k (Proposition 1). Merchants who have relatively low proportion of informed consumers, 
have very high benefit from the advertising and sampling effect, and therefore, they do not change their 
optimal discount rate (1 k ). However, the lower merchant type   shifts to the left (Figure 4).  
PROPOSITION 3: For any given proportion of deal seekers  , as the revenue sharing ratio s  
announced by the website increases,  (i) the lower merchant type   increases for all k , and when
1/ 2k   then the upper merchant type   also increases; and (ii) discount rate offered by merchants of 
relatively high   or low  remains the same, but merchants with intermediate   increase the discount 
rate. 
Higher revenue sharing ratio announced by the daily-deal website reduces merchants’ profitability of 
offering deals on the website. And to that extent, the effect of increase in revenue sharing ratio on 
merchants’ discount strategy is similar to the effect of increase in the proportion of deal seekers described 
in Proposition 2. The key difference between the impact of increase in   and increase in s  is that 
increase in   impacts merchants’ revenue in the second period, but increase in s  impacts merchants’ 
revenue in the first period. Interestingly, when the website increases the revenue sharing ratio, the 
merchants who have higher proportion of informed consumers increase the discount rate offered on the 
website with the permissible bound given in the Proposition 1. Further, as revenue sharing ratio increases, 
the lower merchant type   shifts to the right. This implies that more merchants offer the highest discount 
rate 1 k (Figure 5).  
The economic intuition for this result is as follows. Merchants maximize revenue over the two periods by 
offering discount on the website taking into consideration the advertising, the sampling and the 
cannibalization effects, and revenue loss from deal seekers in the first period. When merchants pay a 
higher share of revenue to the website, their concern about the revenue loss from the informed consumers, 
that is, the cannibalization effect is reduced in the first period. Therefore, merchants offer higher discount 
rate to induce more uninformed consumers in the first period. Conversely, as the proportion of deal 
seekers (  ) increases, merchants’ benefit from uninformed consumers in the second period, that is, the 
sampling effect diminishes. It drives merchants to offer lower discount rate to reduce the cannibalization 
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Figure 5.  Optimal discount rates for different types of merchants as s  changes 
Merchant’s participation decision   
Recall that only those merchants whose profit is higher than the benchmark revenue, * *M B / 2q , 
will offer deals on the daily-deal website. In the next proposition We will examine the impacts of quality 
uncertainty k , the proportion of deal seeker   and the revenue sharing ratio s  on the merchants’ 
decision to participate on the website. The merchants’ participation decision has key impact on the 
website’s revenue and, hence, on the website’s optimal revenue sharing ratio. 
PROPOSITION 4: When the daily-deal website announces zero revenue sharing ratio 0s  , then there 
exists a threshold merchant type ˆ 1   such that any merchant of type ˆ   does not participate on the 
website. As revenue sharing ratio s  or proportion of deal seekers   increases, the threshold merchant 
type ˆ  decreases. 
Merchants decide to participate on the daily-deal website only when their profit from participating is 
more than the benchmark revenue. Proposition 4 highlights that even when the website does not take any 
revenue share from merchants, only those merchants who have proportion of informed consumers below 
a critical value ˆ   offer deals on the website. It is because merchants with high   have more revenue 
loss from cannibalization effect and the deal seeking behavior of informed consumers than revenue gain 
from advertising and sampling effect of the uninformed consumers on the website. The marginal 
merchant type ˆ  is the one whose revenue loss from participation equals revenue gain from participation. 
Note that, as    increases, merchants’ revenue loss from participation increases and revenue gain from 
participation decreases.  
This lends support to some industry experts’ argument that daily-deal websites are only appealing to 
certain types of merchants, and not to all. In fact, some merchants who are relatively well known may 
incur too much revenue loss due to cannibalization, which may be more than the gain from the 
uninformed consumers. Thus, they will not offer deals on the daily-deal website even if website charges 
no fee. It highlights that the economics of the daily-deal website is such that it has potential to attract a 
specific group of relatively less known merchants.  
As the website increases the revenue sharing ratio (higher s ), the revenue gain from participation to 
merchants of any type decreases, while the revenue loss due to cannibalization remains the same even if 
merchants does not increase the discount rate. From Proposition 3, we know that as s  increases, the 
merchants either offer the same discount rate or increase discount rate. It implies the revenue loss due to 
cannibalization may even increase as s  increases. Therefore, the marginal merchant type who participates 
on the website decrease as s  increases (Figure 6). It implies that fewer merchants, whose ˆ[0, ]  , 
participate on the website as s  increases. 
The impact of increase in proportion of deal seekers on the website is similar to the trade-off of revenue 















( )As ( )Bs
(ˆ )Bd s(ˆ )Ad s (ˆ )Bd s
(ˆ )Ad s
 Shivendu & Zhang / Economics of Daily-deal Websites 
  
 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013 13 
increases, the net benefit to merchants from participating on the website decreases (Proposition 2). Hence, 
the marginal merchant type who participates on the website decreases as   increases.  
 
Figure 6.  Marginal merchant who is indifferent from 
participating on website  
 
Note that the merchants’ profit decreases when revenue sharing ratio increases. Therefore, the number of 
merchants, who offer deals on website, decreases as s  increases. This suggests that even if the daily-deal 
website has power to decide revenue sharing ratio for merchants, the website revenue may not be 
monotonically increasing in revenue sharing ratio s .  
COROLLARY 1: When revenue sharing ratio 1s  , then ˆ (1 ) / 2   . 
In a limiting case where the daily-deal website sets the revenue sharing ratio at 1s  , some merchants  
ˆ (1 ) / 2      will still offer deals on the website. It is because for those merchants, the revenue gain 
from uninformed consumers who buy in the second period is more than the revenue loss from all the 
informed consumers who are on the website. Note that, this trade-off of the marginal merchant between 
revenue gain and revenue loss depends only on the proportion of deal seekers on the website as 
highlighted in Corollary 1.  
Corollary 1 highlights the role of the daily-deal website as an effective advertising and sampling 
intermediary, especially to merchants who have lower proportion of informed consumers. Even when 
merchants’ payout is all the revenue generated on the website in the first period, some merchants will 
offer deals on the website.  
PROPOSITION 5: There exists a critical revenue sharing ratio s  such that if s s , then all merchants 
who offer a deal on the website, offer the highest discount rate * 1d k   and ˆ  . 
Merchants’ minimum discount rate is max[0,1 2 ]k  (Proposition 1). When the website increases the 
revenue sharing ratio, the marginal merchant type who offers deal on the website decreases (Proposition 
4). From Proposition 3, we know that as s  increases, the lower merchant type   increase. Therefore, the 
impact of any increase in s  is that the   increases and the ˆ  decreases. Hence, there exists some s  for 
which ˆ  . This implies that for any revenue sharing ratio s s , all merchants who offer deals on the 
website, offer the highest discount rate * 1d k  . This discount rate is independent from merchants’ types, 
website’s revenue sharing ratio, and the proportion of deal seekers on the website. This may explain why 
we observe homogenous high discount rates on daily-deal websites offered by the merchants selling 
similar experience goods which are likely to have the same quality uncertainty ( k ). 
Daily-deal Web Revenue Sharing Ratio 
PROPOSITION 6: There exists an optimal revenue sharing ratio *s  that maximizes daily-deal 
websites revenue. The optimal revenue sharing ratio decreases as proportion of deal seekers    
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Figure 7.  The daily-deal website’s revenue 
 
As the daily-deal website increases revenue sharing ratio, the revenue from each merchant who 
participates increases, but fewer merchants offer deals on the website (Proposition 4). Since the revenue 
of the website is a product of revenue from each merchant and the mass of merchants who participate, 
there exists an optimal revenue sharing ratio ( *s ) which maximizes the revenue of the website (Figure 7). 
When the proportion of deal seekers on the website is higher, merchants’ potential gain from uninformed 
consumers in the second period decreases, thus profitability of offering deals on the website decreases. 
This leads to lower mass of merchants who participate on the website (Proposition 4). Hence, the 
website’s revenue decreases for any given revenue sharing ratio. Therefore, the daily-deal website 
decreases the revenue sharing ratio to increase the mass of merchants who participate on the website. 
This leads to decrease in optimal revenue sharing ratio as   increases (Left plot in Figure 7). 
Optimal revenue sharing ratio of the website also depends on quality uncertainty of uninformed 
consumers on the website. When quality uncertainty is low (high k ), merchants offer a lower discount 
rate and consequently revenue loss due to informed consumers on the website in the first period, that is, 
the cannibalization effect is low. Thus, more merchants offer deals on the website and also offer lower 
discount rate. This implies that for any given revenue sharing ratio, the daily-deal website’s revenue 
increases as k  increases. However, counter-intuitively, the optimal revenue sharing ratio for the website 
decreases as  k  increases. This is because the loss of the revenue from each merchant by lowing s  is over 
compensated by the gain in revenue from larger mass of merchants who offer deals on the website.  
Discussion 
In this paper, we study the dynamics of merchants’ discount strategy on a daily-deal website and how the 
website’s revenue sharing agreement affects merchants’ and the website’s profitability. We find that 
website is relatively more attractive to the less known merchants. This is because these less known 
merchants have less concern about revenue loss from the informed consumers that is, low cannibalization 
effect and have greater revenue gain from the uninformed consumers, that is, large positive advertising 
and sampling effect. We also show that merchants’ optimal discount rate depends on the proportion of 
deal seekers on the website, the quality uncertainty, and the announced revenue sharing ratio by the 
website.  
The optimal discount rates offered by merchants are bounded in a range. Merchants do not get the 
maximum gain in revenue from uninformed consumers if the discount rate is not comparable to their 
quality uncertainty. Moreover, both merchants and the website are more profitable when the proportion 
of deal seekers decreases or the uninformed consumers’ uncertainty about the merchants’ quality 
decrease. However, the website’s optimal revenue sharing ratio increases when the proportion of deal 
seekers decreases, but decreases when the uninformed consumers’ uncertainty about the product quality 
decreases.  
Our results offer some insights on daily-deal website industry. One of managerial recommendation is that 
the daily-deal website should reduce the new consumers’ uncertainty about the quality of the experience 
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assurance certification. Another managerial recommendation is that the daily-deal website should have 
customized contract with merchants. We show that the merchants’ incentive to offer a deal depends on 
the merchant’s type and it is optimal for the website to have customized contract according to merchants’ 
characteristics. We also recommend that the website should allow merchants to offer customized discount 
rates operating in different consumer demographics which may have different proportion of deal seekers. 
Our stylized two-period game has some limitations. We do not consider the competition effect on daily-
deal websites’ strategy. Competition between rival daily-deal websites may potentially lower websites’ 
revenue sharing ratio. This may encourage more merchants to offer deals on the websites that offers lower 
revenue sharing ratio. This lowering of revenue sharing ratio may induce merchants to offer higher 
discount rates. Furthermore, we can study the daily-deal website’s the impact of membership fee structure 
on its optimal fixed fee contract on transactions by the merchants. Finally, in our model all uninformed 
consumers under-estimate the quality. Modeling a market where some uninformed consumers 
underestimate the quality while some others over-estimate the quality, may be a fruitful avenue for future 
research.  
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Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions 
Proof for Proposition 1: 
From Equation 3, and consumer valuation for quality [0,1]U  , and consumers buy if they derive non-
negative utility. Therefore, w1i 1- (1- )/D p d q , 
w
1u 1- (1- )/( )D p d kq , 
o
1i 1- (1- )/D p d q  for the first period. 
The second period demand proportion for the informed consumers are the same as the benchmark case, 
w
2i 1 / 2D  and 
o
2i 1 / 2D , but the demand proportion for the uninformed consumers depends on the 
discount rate in the first period:  when 1 2 1k d k , then w2u 1- (1- )/( )D p d kq ; when
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0 1 2d k , then w2u 0D ; when 1 1k d , then 
w
2u 1 / 2D . Substitute these demand 
proportion into Equation 1,2, and 3, we can solve the merchants’ maximizing profit problem w.r.t 
discount rate ■ 
 
Proof for Proposition 2 and Proposition 3: 
From Proposition 1, we have 
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We prove Proposition 2 and 3 ■ 
 
Proof for Proposition 4 and Corollary 1: 
From Proposition, we can get the merchants’ optimal profit of offering deals on the website,  
 * *M M( )d . Merchants then decide whether to participate in the daily-deal website if only if  
* *
M B . 
Given an announced revenue sharing ratio, s , we can solve for the marginal merchant whose profit of 
offering deals is the same as the benchmark case, ˆ  is solution to  * *M B
ˆ( , )s . Since, merchants’ 
discount rate depends relative magnitude of  with respect to   and  , we have, where s s
2
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Taking derivative against ˆ  with respect to  s  or , then we can get the directional impacts. 
By substitute 0s s  , we get 
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We prove Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 ■ 
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Proof for Proposition 6: 
When the daily-deal website announce a revenue sharing ratio, s  , merchants whose ˆ   offer deals on 
the website. Among the participating merchants who offer deals, for those ˆ    , the optimal discount 
rate is * ˆd d , and for those ˆ0 0        , the optimal discount rate is * 1d k   . Thus, website’s 
revenue from Equation 4 is: 
ˆ
W 0
( (1 / 2) (1 ) / 2 )dC Cs n k pk n pk , if 





( (1 (1  ) / 2) (1  ) (1 ) (1 (1  ) / ( 2)) (1  ))d
        ( (1 / 2) (1 ) / 2 )d
C C
C C
s n d p d n d k p d
s n k pk n pk
. And the website’s 
revenue maximization problem is: Wmax  
s
■ 
